Venezuela’s links to the UK are complex: Guaido was recognised as president, but the UK maintains diplomatic relations with Maduro’s government and has an ambassador in Venezuela accredited by Maduro. Nonetheless, Teare J affirmed that the VCB was not entitled to the money held in London due to the VCB being controlled by Maduro. He further ruled that to release the gold would be incompatible with the British government’s decision to recognise Guaido. Indeed, previous cases have shown that institutions of the state must speak with one voice on issues of foreign affairs. Such was the case in matters involving Somalia in 1993, as well as a Libyan lawsuit in 2016 on wealth funds. 

Section 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 guarantees judicial independence, meaning the judges in the UK are independent and apolitical, at least in theory. However, the present case proves that international judicial decisions may be influenced by the government’s foreign policy.

Maduro’s lawyers said they would appeal the decision, risking to further damage the already fraught relations with Venezuela, which has been ravaged by the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. If matters escalate, the UK is liable to find itself in the same position as the United States as of January 2019, with no formal diplomatic relations with Venezuela. 

The contested decision may set a precedent for future judicial decisions on foreign assets held at the Bank of England. For example, it remains unclear whether the UK judiciary would freeze assets owned by Hong Kong should the 1997 Sino-British Joint Declaration be breached due to the novel security law passed by the Chinese government. The UK’s move to suspend the extradition treaty it has with Hong Kong shows its preference to maintain positive diplomatic relations with China, and it remains to be seen just how far the UK dares go.